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Hoback: The Best of Both Worlds

THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS: RECONCILING TRADITION
WITH EVOLUTION UNDER THE OHIO AND FEDERAL RIGHT TO
A CIVIL JURY TRIAL
Jacob Hoback*

I. INTRODUCTION
The guarantees in the Bill of Rights do not only limit federal
governmental power.1 Although the Bill of Rights was originally applied
only as a limit on the federal government, the Supreme Court has held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates
many of the individual rights provided in the Bill of Rights against the
states.2 Thus, the Bill of Rights today is also a limit on state governmental
power.3
One exception, however, is the right to a civil jury trial under the
Seventh Amendment.4 Under the doctrine of selective incorporation, the
Fourteenth Amendment only incorporates parts of the Bill of Rights
against the states, and one such excluded provision is the right to a civil
jury trial.5 Nevertheless, most state governments established their own
right to a civil jury trial under their respective constitutions.6
As a result, state courts often disagree with federal courts about how to
implement the right to a civil jury trial.7 There are two competing interests
in analyzing whether the right to a civil jury trial exists under a cause of
action: tradition and evolution. On one hand, the right to a civil jury trial
requires a historical analysis, given the language of many state
constitutions as well as the Federal Constitution.8 For example, the
*

Citations Editor, 2021-2022, University of Cincinnati Law Review. I would like to thank Donald P.
Klekamp Professor of Law Michael E. Solimine for his invaluable assistance in writing this Note.
1. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1136 (1991).
2. Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323,
331-32 (2011).
3. Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, The Church Autonomy Doctrine: Where Tort
Law Should Step Aside, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 444 (2012).
4. George E. Butler II, Compensable Liberty: A Historical and Political Model of the Seventh
Amendment Public Law Jury, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 595, 765 (1985).
5. Amanda Szuch, Reconsidering Contractual Waivers of the Right to a Jury Trial in Federal
Court, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 435, 436 (2011).
6. Eric J. Hamilton, Federalism and the State Civil Jury Rights, 65 STAN. L. REV. 851, 855
(2013).
7. For incorporated rights, states are bound by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Bill of
Rights, but because the Seventh Amendment is unincorporated, state courts interpreting their own
constitutions may differ from U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Richard Boldt & Dan Friedman,
Constitutional Incorporation: A Consideration of the Judicial Function in State and Federal
Constitutional Interpretation, 76 MD. L. REV. 309, 312 (2017).
8. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VII. (“The right of trial by jury shall be preserved”) (emphasis
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Illinois Constitution states that “[t]he right of trial by jury as heretofore
enjoyed shall remain inviolate.”9 In other words, the right was meant to
exist as it did at the time of its ratification, and thus, a historical analysis
is instructive to determine how to preserve the right as it originally
existed.10 On the other hand, the promulgation of new statutes and causes
of action requires courts to reconcile new legislation with a prescribed
traditional approach.11
In weighing the two interests, Ohio courts and federal courts are on
opposite ends of the spectrum.12 The Ohio Constitution states that the
right of trial by jury “shall be inviolate.”13 Ohio courts require that a cause
of action actually exist at the time of the ratification of the first Ohio
constitution for there to be a right to a jury trial, whereas federal courts
primarily consider the current nature of the cause of action as it exists
today without any historical inquiry.14 This is no minor disagreement,
because in some cases, the difference is outcome-determinative.15
Ohio and federal courts can find a middle ground. Both approaches
focus disproportionately on one interest and effectively disregard the
other. This Note proposes a new approach under which the two interests
could coexist. Under this proposal, a court would identify the current
cause of action in a case and compare it to the most analogous cause of
action at the time of the right’s ratification.16 Then, the court would ask
whether a jury trial was guaranteed under the historical analog and rule
accordingly. Consequently, courts could maintain the right as it existed at
its adoption, while also making it relevant for current legislation.
Thus, this Note argues that Ohio courts and federal courts should adopt
a hybrid approach to determining whether a jury trial is guaranteed for
any given civil cause of action. First, Section II provides a background of
the federal and state constitutional provisions and how courts have
added); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13. (“The right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate”)
(emphasis added); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21. (“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate”)
(emphasis added).
9. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13 (emphasis added).
10. Suja A. Thomas, The Civil Jury: The Disregarded Constitutional Actor, U. CIN. PUB. L. &
LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPER SERIES NO. 07-30 at 3 (2007).
11. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (applying the right to a jury trial to the Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act).
12. 4 Ohio Civil Practice with Forms § 174.02 (2022).
13. OHIO CONST., art. I, § 5.
14. Id.
15. See e.g., Hoops v. United Tel. Co., 553 N.E. 2d 252 (Ohio 1990) (holding that the right to a
civil jury trial does not exist under a cause of action alleging age discrimination under Ohio law, even
though the federal analysis results in a right to a jury trial under similar causes of action).
16. In fact, this is the first of two prongs of the current federal approach, but federal courts now
hardly give it any consideration. See e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry,
494 U.S. 558 (1990) (giving weight only to the second prong of the two-part test). Currently, however,
no jurisdiction analyzes the first prong exclusively, which is what this Note proposes.
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interpreted them. Then, Section III discusses the proposed approach and
explains how it preserves tradition while also making the right applicable
to modern causes of action. Finally, Section IV concludes by considering
the consequences of the proposed hybrid approach.
II. BACKGROUND
Unlike the English legal system, the American legal system does not
clearly prescribe whether a right to a jury trial exists. Under English law,
if the plaintiff sought a legal remedy, the parties were generally entitled
to a jury trial, and if the plaintiff sought an equitable remedy, the parties
were generally not.17 Federal and state constitutions, however, add a new
level of complexity, because their texts call for a historic inquiry.18 The
U.S. Constitution states that “the right to a trial by jury shall be
preserved.”19 Similarly, most state constitutions include language of
historical reference such as “as heretofore enjoyed.”20 In other words, the
right under the U.S. legal system depends on practices at the time when
states ratified their constitutions.21 The question is: how should courts
analyze new causes of action under a historic test?
This Section explains how Ohio and federal courts have approached
this issue. First, Part A describes how the right to a civil jury trial became
part of the American legal system. Next, Part B explains the difference
between legal and equitable relief. Then, Part C summarizes how Ohio
and federal courts analyze the issue by looking at Teamsters v. Terry22
from the United States Supreme Court and Hoops v. United Telephone
Company23 from the Ohio Supreme Court.
A. Pre-Revolutionary Origins of the Right
If asked which right is most crucial for the preservation of a Nation,
many would not think of the right to a jury trial but rather the rights to
free speech or to keep and bear arms.24 This, however, was untrue for

17. Fleming James Jr., Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 655 (1963).
18. Id. at 657.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added).
20. See e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13 (“The right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain
inviolate”) (emphasis added); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate”) (emphasis added).
21. Hamilton, supra note 6, at 885.
22. 494 U.S. 558 (1990).
23. Hoops v. United Telephone Co., 553 N.E. 2d 252 (Ohio 1990).
24. See e.g., Peter Moore, First Amendment is the most important, and well known, Amendment,
YOUGOV
(Apr.
12, 2016, 3:15
PM),
https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articlesreports/2016/04/12/bill-rights; Why the Second Amendment Is Our Most Important Right, TEEN INK
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many of the great legal minds of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
for whom the right to a jury trial was one of the most cherished rights in
the early Anglo-American legal system.25 For example, renowned
English jurist William Blackstone regarded the right to a civil jury trial as
“the glory of the English law.”26 To Blackstone and many other legal
thinkers, the right to a jury trial was sacred because in a jury trial, a
person’s fate was not in the hands of the government but rather “the
unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbours [sic] and equals.”27
1. The Federal Right to a Civil Jury Trial
The role of the jury is deeply rooted in pre-revolutionary history.28 As
early as 1624, juries were a component of all civil and criminal cases in
Virginia and many other colonies.29 Nevertheless, the privilege was later
undermined by British rule.30 In the 1760s, disputes were increasingly
tried in admiralty and vice-admiralty courts, which did not require a
jury.31 This strongly contributed to the tensions between America and
Great Britain.32
After the Revolutionary War, when the Framers discussed what should
be included in the original Constitution, they were reluctant to establish a
right to a civil jury trial.33 Almost all the Framers supported a right to a
federal criminal jury trial, but there was disagreement about whether to
afford the right in civil cases.34 One concern was the possibility that juries
would be overly sympathetic with defendants who were sued under
disfavored laws.35
(October 2, 2011), https://www.teenink.com/opinion/current_events_politics/article/369588/Why-theSecond-Amendment-is-our-Most-important-Right.
25. Suja A. Thomas, Blackstone’s Curse: The Fall of the Criminal, Civil, and Grand Juries and
the Rise of the Executive, the Legislature, the Judiciary, and the States, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1195,
1202 (2014).
26. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 379 (Univ. of Chi.
Press 1979) (1768) (emphasis added).
27. Id.
28. See generally Stephen Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated
History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579 (1993).
29. Id. at 592.
30. Id. at 595.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Renee Lettow Lerner, The Failure of Originalism in Preserving Constitutional Rights to Civil
Jury Trial, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 811, 824 (2014) (explaining the origins of the right to a jury
trial under the U.S. Constitution).
34. Id.
35. Renee Lettow Lerner and Suja A. Thomas, The Seventh Amendment, CONSTITUTION CENTER,
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/amendment-vii/interps/125
(last
visited April 17, 2021).
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Nevertheless, advocates of a right to a civil jury trial—mostly
antifederalists—were so adamant that they conditioned ratification of the
Constitution on its inclusion.36 For many, the importance of including the
right stemmed from concerns regarding the separation of powers.37
Although most of the guarantees in the Constitution act as a check on
executive and legislative powers, the right to a jury trial serves as a check
on judicial power.38 Moreover, they regarded the jury trial as “the surest
barrier against arbitrary power, and the palladium of liberty, with the loss
of which the loss of our freedom may be dated.”39 Accordingly, many
antifederalists feared that the lack of a right to a jury trial in civil cases
would lead to corruption and political bias in the judicial system.40
Despite the efforts of the antifederalists, the original U.S. Constitution
did not include a right to a civil jury trial; instead, the right was included
later in the Seventh Amendment.41 The federalists argued that a federal
right to a civil jury trial was unworkable and that if states wanted to
incorporate it into their own constitutions, they were free to do so.42 After
relentlessly protesting, however, more than half of the ratifying states
called for Congress to enact an amendment establishing a right to a civil
jury trial.43 Consequently, Congress drafted an amendment establishing
the right, and in 1791, Congress ratified the Bill of Rights, which included
the right to a civil jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.44 The
Amendment provides that “[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in
any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law.”45
2. The Ohio Right to a Civil Jury Trial
The right to a jury trial existed in Ohio even before Ohio became a
state.46 Although the General Assembly did not draft the first Ohio
Constitution until 1802, Ohio’s constitutional history began in 1787 with
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Lerner, supra note 33, at 825.
Id. at 830.
Id.
THE ANTI-FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Brutus).
Lerner, supra note 33, at 826.
Landsman, supra note 8, at 598.
Id.
Id. at 600.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
STEVEN H. STEINGLASS & GINO J. SCARSELLI, THE OHIO STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 7 (Praeger, 2004).
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the Northwest Ordinance.47 Along with providing a structure of
government, the Northwest Ordinance included a bill of rights, which
included “the right to religious freedom, habeas corpus, trial by jury, due
process, and reasonable bail (except in capital cases).” 48
Then, when Ohio became a state, the General Assembly included the
right to a civil jury trial in its first constitution.49 Although there has only
been one U.S. Constitution, there have been three Ohio Constitutions, and
all three constitutions included a right to a civil jury trial.50 During the
1851 revision of the original Ohio constitution, the right to a civil jury
trial never changed, textually or substantively.51 The Bill of Rights of the
first Ohio Constitution stated “that the right of trial by jury shall be
inviolate.”52 Now, the phrase exists in the Ohio Constitution in Article I,
Section 5.53 Despite the fact that Ohio ratified its current constitution in
1851, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the provision is only
applicable to causes of action for which a right to a jury trial existed at the
time of the ratification of Ohio’s first constitution in 1802.54
B. The Distinction of Law and Equity
Early American jurists believed that the American right to a jury trial
should be the same as it was under the English legal system.55 When
interpreting what the Framers of the Seventh Amendment meant by
“common law,” Circuit Justice Story explained that “[b]eyond all
question, the common law. . . is not the common law of any individual
state, (for it probably differs in all), but it is the common law of England,
the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence.”56
Under English common law, the existence of a right to a jury trial
depended on the type of relief sought: legal or equitable.57 The distinction
between legal and equitable relief is fairly straightforward. Legal relief is
best thought of as monetary damages, and equitable relief is best thought

47. Id.
48. Id. at 8.
49. OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 8.
50. 4 Ohio Civil Practice with Forms § 174.02 (2020); OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 8; OHIO
CONST., art I, § 5.
51. 4 Ohio Civil Practice with Forms § 174.02 (2020).
52. OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 8.
53. OHIO CONST., art. I, § 5.
54. 4 Ohio Civil Practice with Forms § 174.02 (2020) (citing Mason v. State, 58 Ohio St. 30 (Ohio
1898)).
55. United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (No. 16,750) (C.C.D. Mass. 1812).
56. Id.
57. Fleming, supra note 17, at 655.
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of as a court order for a party to do something.58 Consider something as
simple as contract law. If John breaches a contract with Mary, Mary has
two options: she could ask the court for monetary damages from John to
compensate for the loss that she suffered as a result of the breach—a legal
remedy—or she could ask the court to order John to fulfill his end of the
contract—an equitable remedy.59
Thus, in accordance with English tradition, whether a right to a jury
trial exists in the American legal system largely depends on the type of
relief sought.60 Justice Story explained that an inquiry about the type of
remedy sought is necessary under the Seventh Amendment.61 In Parsons
v. Bedford, the Court concluded that “[b]y ‘common law,’ the framers of
the constitution of the United States meant. . .suits in which legal rights
were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where
equitable rights alone were regarded, and equitable remedies were
administered.”62 In other words, “common law” under the Seventh
Amendment referred to causes of action in which the plaintiff sought a
legal remedy—not an equitable one. Following Justice Story’s tenure, the
Court has consistently relied on Parsons and the legal-equitable
distinction to determine whether the right to a jury trial exists.63
In sum, the right to a jury trial—both under Ohio and federal law—
exists today only in causes of action that seek legal relief, as opposed to
equitable relief.64
C. Where Ohio Courts and Federal Courts Disagree
The question of whether a right to a jury trial exists is more complex
now than it was under the English common law, because while English
courts only analyzed the type of relief sought, American courts add a
historical analysis.65 Because of the historic language in the Seventh

58. Equity, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/equity (last
visited Mar. 26, 2021).
59. Of course, a court will still determine whether the particular type of relief sought is
appropriate. See generally Emily L. Sherwin, Law and Equity in Contract Enforcement, 50 MD. L. REV.
253 (1991). This example is merely to demonstrate the differences between the types of relief.
60. Samuel L. Bray, Equity, Law, and the Seventh Amendment, 100 TEX. L. REV. 467, 468 (2022).
61. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 434 (1830).
62. Id.
63. See e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974) (citing Parsons, 28 U.S. at 446-47).
64. Parsons, 28 U.S. at 446 (“The phrase ‘common law,’ found in this clause, is used in
contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence”); Digital & Analog Design Corp.
v. N. Supply Co., 590 N.E.2d 737, 742 (Ohio 1992) (citing Taylor v. Brown, 92 Ohio St. 287 (Ohio 1915)
(“[W]e have long held that a right to a jury trial does not exist if the relief sought is equitable rather than
legal.”)).
65. Lerner, supra note 33, at 813.
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Amendment,66 legal scholars have concluded that “the scope of the
federal constitutional right to a jury trial is largely, or even entirely,
determined by historical considerations, not functional ones.”67
Accordingly, to determine whether a right to a civil jury trial exists,
federal courts apply what they call a historical test, although the Court
admits that the test is not really historically-based anymore.68 Similarly,
although the right to a civil jury trial in the Ohio Constitution does not
contain a historical reference point,69 Ohio courts have held that a
historical analysis is instructive70 and have applied one since 1836.71
Although Ohio and federal courts agree that the key question is whether
the relief sought is legal or equitable, the courts disagree about the role
that history should play in answering that question. Ohio courts apply a
very formalistic historic inquiry.72 In contrast, federal courts effectively
do not perform a historical inquiry at all.73 Instead, federal courts look
primarily to the nature of the remedy sought.74 For example, if a cause of
action seeks injunctive relief, federal courts usually hold that a right to a
civil jury trial does not exist because injunctive relief is usually an
equitable remedy, even though that particular cause of action might have
been tried in a court of law at the time of the Constitution’s ratification.75
In contrast, Ohio courts require that the cause of action actually existed at
common law.76 In other words, the Ohio constitution only guarantees the
right of trial by jury in those cases where it existed previous to its
adoption.”77
66. The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n Suits at common law. . .the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved.” U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added).
67. Bray, supra note 60, at 474.
68. Although the Supreme Court claims to follow the “historic test,” the Court candidly admits
that it focuses primarily on the nature of relief sought, not historic analogs of the cause of action.
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989) (“The form of our analysis is familiar. ‘First,
we compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the
merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, we examine the remedy sought and determine whether it
is legal or equitable in nature.’ The second stage of this analysis is more important than the first.”) (internal
citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
69. The Ohio Constitution provides “that the right to a trial by jury shall be inviolate.” Ohio
Const., art. I, § 5. Cf. The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n Suits at common law. . .the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved.” U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added).
70. Hoops v. United Telephone Co., 553 N.E. 2d 252, 255 (Ohio 1990). (citing Willyard v.
Hamilton, 7 Ohio 398, 402 (Ohio 1836)).
71. See, e.g., Schafer v. RMS Realty, 138 Ohio App. 3d 244 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
72. See, e.g., Hoops, 553 N.E. 2d 252 (holding that a jury trial does not exist for causes of action
established after 1802).
73. See supra, note 68.
74. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-18 (1987).
75. See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry 494 U.S. 558, 573
(1990).
76. McIntyre v. Northern Properties, 412 N.E.2d 434, 438 (Ohio 1979).
77. Belding v. State, 121 Ohio St. 393, 393 (1929).
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To illustrate this disagreement, this Part summarizes Teamsters v.
Terry78 from the U.S. Supreme Court and Hoops v. United Tel. Co.79 from
the Ohio Supreme Court. Both cases involved a plaintiff asserting a cause
of action that did not exist at the time of the respective constitutions’
adoption. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that although the suit would have
been equitable in 1791, its nature was legal, and thus, a jury right
existed.80 In contrast, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that because the
cause of action did not exist in 1802, no jury right existed.81
1. Teamsters v. Terry
Federal courts apply a two-part analysis to determine whether a right
to a civil jury trial exists.82 They weigh (1) whether the historical
common-law analog was legal or equitable and (2) the nature of the relief
sought in the current cause of action.83 For example, in Curtis v. Loether,
the Supreme Court held that a jury trial is guaranteed under a Title VIII
housing discrimination action because Title VIII is analogous to the
common law duty of innkeepers to provide housing to a nomad—a cause
of action that provides a legal remedy.84 Additionally, the Court reasoned
that the relief was legal in nature because it asked for actual and punitive
damages, which were “the traditional form of relief offered in the courts
of law.”85 Therefore, the Court held that a jury trial was guaranteed under
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act.86
As time went on, however, the Court gave significantly less
consideration to the first prong of the test and effectively only considered
the second prong.87 This happened in Teamsters v. Terry, where the
question presented was whether the Seventh Amendment entitled the
parties to a jury trial where an employee sought relief in the form of
backpay under breach of a union’s fair duty of representation—a cause of
action that did not exist in 1791.88 In Teamsters, employees of a trucking
company were laid off sporadically, and their union allegedly breached
its duty of fair representation by not referring the employees’ complaints
78. Teamsters, 494 U.S. 558.
79. Hoops, 553 N.E. 2d 252.
80. Teamsters, 494 U.S. at 573.
81. Hoops, 553 N.E. 2d at 255.
82. See, e.g., Curtis, 415 U.S. 195, 196 (1974).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 195 n. 10.
85. Id. at 196.
86. Id. at 196, 198.
87. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry 494 U.S. 558, 574 (1990).
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
88. Id. at 561.
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to a grievance committee.89 Consequently, the employees filed a lawsuit
against their former union.90 The union moved to strike the employees’
request for a jury trial, but the District Court and Fourth Circuit held that
the Seventh Amendment entitled the employees to a jury trial.91
Although the claim would have been considered equitable in 1791, the
Court held a right to a jury trial existed because the claim was legal in
nature.92 To reach this result, the Court first considered whether the case
would have been legal or equitable in 1791.93 In doing so, the Court
reasoned that the claim against the union was most analogous to an action
against a trustee for breach of fiduciary duty, which was an equitable
cause of action.94 Despite that historic analogue, the Court determined
that a breach of duty of fair representation was a legal claim in nature
because the claim did not seek restitution or injunctive relief.95 Therefore,
the Court held that the employees were entitled to a civil jury trial under
their backpay claim.96
Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment, argued that the Court
should only consider the second prong.97 He agreed that since the cause
of action was legal in nature, the employees were entitled to a jury trial.98
But contrary to the majority’s reasoning, he believed that the only inquiry
the Court should make was the nature of the relief sought because he
believed that a deep historic inquiry was too onerous for jurists who are
generally not qualified to make such historical speculations.99 Although
the majority based its decision almost exclusively on the nature of the
relief sought, Justice Brennan believed that the Court should “dispense
with [the historical inquiry] altogether.”100
Justice Kennedy was on the other side of the spectrum from his
colleague Justice Brennan. In a dissenting opinion, he argued that once
the Court concluded that the duty of fair representation was analogous to
an equitable trust action, the Court’s analysis should have stopped.101 He
explained that the Court should have conducted a historical analysis

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 562.
Id.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 574. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 584 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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“because the language of the Constitution requires it.”102 Additionally, he
expressed concern that “if we abandon the plain language of the
Constitution to expand the jury right, we may expect Courts with
opposing views to curtail it in the future.”103 In other words, allowing
courts to stray away from the original meaning of the Seventh
Amendment might ultimately result in courts reaching a conclusion that
restricts the right to a civil jury trial, even though a jury trial might have
been guaranteed under a similar cause of action in 1791.
B. Hoops v. United Telephone Company
The Supreme Court of Ohio reached a different conclusion in Hoops v.
United Telephone Company.104 The issue in Hoops was whether a right
to a jury trial existed under an Ohio anti-discrimination statute—a cause
of action that did not exist in 1802.105 In Hoops, a construction foreman
claimed that he was terminated from his job because of his age.106 He
requested a jury trial, but the trial court denied the motion, and the court
of appeals affirmed.107
The court held that a jury trial was not constitutionally required because
the right “applies only where trial by jury existed previous to its
adoption.”108 Further, the court explained that “[a]ctions for employment
discrimination, including age discrimination, did not exist at common law
and, therefore, no right to trial of these actions by a jury existed at
common law.”109 The plaintiff argued that Ohio courts should follow the
lead of federal courts, where the right to a civil jury trial existed in
employment discrimination suits.110 But the court rejected that argument,
explaining that “[t]he legislature has clearly expressed its intention by the
words used in the statute.”111
III. DISCUSSION
Ohio and federal courts should both revisit their analyses in deciding
when the right to a civil jury trial exists. Both approaches fail to appreciate
the sacred tradition of the right and accommodate new causes of action.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 592-93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 593.
Hoops, 553 N.E. 2d 252.
Id. at 252.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 257 (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 190 (1974)).
Id.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2022

11

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 3 [2022], Art. 6

962

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90

This Section proposes a new approach. First, Part A explains the problems
with the Ohio interpretation. Then, Part B explains the problems with the
federal interpretation. Finally, Part C proposes a hybrid approach under
which courts would identify the common law analog of a modern cause
of action and consider whether it was legal or equitable at the time of the
right’s ratification.
A. Problems with Ohio’s Interpretation
Ohio’s interpretation of the right to a civil jury trial is problematic for
three reasons. First, Ohio courts have no textual basis for their rigid
historical requirement that the cause of action existed in 1802. Second,
even the strictest form of originalism is less restrictive than Ohio’s
approach. Finally, Ohio’s interpretation creates a capricious distinction
between causes of action in 1802 and causes of action established
thereafter.
1. The Text
There is no textual support for Ohio’s strict historical analysis. The
Ohio Constitution is unique because it does not have a reference point: a
word or phrase such as “preserve,” “remain,” or “as heretofore
enjoyed,”112 which would signal some sort of connection to a particular
point in time.113 These reference points indicate that the right “is
dependent on history and ‘freezes’ the practice as it was.” 114 But Ohio’s
text does not contain any reference point at all. Thus, Ohio lacks a textual
basis for any historical inquiry.115
Comparing the Ohio Constitution with other constitutions further
demonstrates this point. First, compare Ohio’s constitution with the
federal Constitution. Ironically, the federal analysis is less historicallyfocused than the Ohio test, yet the text of the federal Constitution places
greater emphasis on history than the Ohio Constitution.116 Specifically,
the Federal Constitution provides that the right to a civil jury trial “shall
be preserved.”117 The Ohio Constitution, however, only provides that “the
112. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“The right of trial by jury shall be preserved”) (emphasis
added); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13 (“The right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate”)
(emphasis added); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate”) (emphasis
added).
113. Hamilton, supra note 6, at 885.
114. Id.
115. Id. Hamilton argues in his article that merely holding a right inviolate could indicate a more
expansive view of the right.
116. See, e.g., Curtis, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
117. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added).
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right of trial by jury shall be inviolate.”118 In other words, federal courts
would be more justified in adopting Ohio’s approach, but even the federal
analysis leaves room for modern causes of action.
Next, consider the Illinois Constitution. The Supreme Court of Illinois
has the same requirement as Ohio—that the statute existed at common
law.119 Illinois’s strict requirement is justified, though, by the language of
its constitution. It provides that “the right of trial by jury as heretofore
enjoyed shall remain inviolate.”120 Given the temporal words such as
“remain” and “as heretofore enjoyed,” the Supreme Court of Illinois must
have reasoned that the Framers of the Illinois Constitution intended that
the jury trial would be limited to only what existed at the time of its
ratification. Although the Ohio Supreme Court provides the same
analysis, its right to a civil jury trial is not rooted in the same historicallyfocused language and is thus unjustified in applying such a rigid
approach.
Moreover, some other state constitutions contain reference points but
do not apply a test as strict as Ohio’s. For example, the New Jersey
Constitution provides that “[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate.”121 Despite the reference point to the framing of the New Jersey
Constitution, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected a strict historical
test like the one Ohio applies.122 Instead, like federal courts, it focuses
mostly on the nature of remedy sought.123
Finally, no reasonable mind would interpret “inviolate” the way that
Ohio does with respect to a jury trial when additional rights are at stake.
For example, Alabama law provides that “[e]very voter shall have the
right to vote a secret ballot, and that ballot shall be kept secret and
inviolate.”124 Suppose that the Alabama legislature established a new
office that did not exist at the date of the statute’s adoption. No person
could reasonably argue that ballots for that office could be destroyed since
the office did not exist at the time of the enactment of the statute. For the
same reason, Ohio’s analysis of the word “inviolate” is erroneous.
Therefore, because the text of Ohio’s right to a civil jury trial does not
contain a historical reference point, Ohio courts should not adopt a strict
historical analysis.

118. OHIO CONST., art. I, § 5.
119. Martin v. Heintold Commodities, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 734, 755 (Ill. 1994) (“We thus find that the
Consumer Fraud Act is a statutory proceeding unknown to the common law. Because of this, our
constitution does not confer the right to a jury trial. . .”).
120. ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 13 (emphasis added).
121. N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 9.
122. Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co. v. Lajara, 222 N.J. 129, 142-43 (N.J. 2015).
123. Id.
124. Ala. Code § 17-6-34 (2018) (emphasis added).
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2. Originalism
Even if Ohio’s constitution calls for the application of originalism,125
such a method of interpretation would not support Ohio’s analysis.
Originalism does require a historical analysis, but even the strictest
methods of interpretation consider modern realities. For example, Justice
Scalia, one whose interpretive methodology is often criticized as
formalistic, did not simply discount the constitutionality of any new
innovations because they did not exist at ratification but instead asked
what the Framers would have expected if the innovation existed then.126
His type of interpretation is referred to as “expected application
originalism.”127 Although it is commonly identified as restrictive, even
this type of originalism accommodates “new phenomena and new
technologies—like television or radio—by analogical extension with
phenomena and technologies that existed at the time of adoption.”128
Take, for instance, Kyllo v. United States.129 There, to determine
whether Danny Kyllo was using a high-intensity lamp to grow marijuana,
the United States Department of the Interior used a thermal imager to
gauge the radiation levels inside of Kyllo’s house.130 The scan
unequivocally revealed that Kyllo was growing marijuana, and the
government then successfully convicted Kyllo for illegally growing
marijuana.131 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the search was a violation
of the Fourth Amendment.132 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia used
expected-application originalism.133 He started from the basic principle
of the Fourth Amendment at the time of the ratification: that “the Fourth
Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance of a house.’”134 Next, he
explained that the Court “must take the long view, from the original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment forward.”135 Applying the old
principles of the Fourth Amendment under the modern facts, Justice
Scalia concluded that “[w]here, as here, the Government uses a device
that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would
125. Prof. Suja Thomas argues that the text of the right to a civil jury trial requires originalism due
to the historic language. Thomas, supra note 10, at 3.
126. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Originalism and Summary Judgment, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 919, 927 (2010).
There are many forms of originalism, but the purpose of comparing Ohio’s analysis to this form of
originalism is to illustrate that even the strictest form of originalism does not support Ohio’s analysis.
127. Id.
128. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 296-97 (2007).
129. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 25 (2001).
130. Id. at 29-30.
131. Id. at 30.
132. Id. at 40.
133. Id.
134. Id. (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
135. Id.
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previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant.”136
Thus, Ohio’s inquiry is not just formal originalism; it is historical
rigidity. In Kyllo, the majority did not discount the right to privacy just
because thermal imaging did not exist in 1791. Instead, it applied the
understanding of the law to new phenomena. Ohio courts should ask the
same question: how was the right to a civil jury trial understood, and how
can that understanding be applied today? Asking this question allows
Ohio courts to both preserve the desires of the drafters of the Ohio
constitution and also make the right applicable to modern situations. At
common law, the test only considered whether the cause of action sought
a legal or equitable remedy, and there were no qualifications or extra
requirements relating to how long the cause of action existed. Ohio courts
should not restrict the right to a jury trial merely because of the point in
time when the General Assembly established a cause of action. That does
not mean that no historical inquiry is needed. But courts should not just
ignore new phenomena. Instead, they should consider how the new
phenomena would have been considered by the drafters of the
constitutions.
3. A Capricious Distinction
Finally, Ohio’s distinction between causes of action that existed in
1802 and causes of action that were established thereafter is entirely
capricious. Ohio essentially uses two elements to determine whether a
right to a jury trial is guaranteed: (1) that the cause of action existed in
1802 and (2) that the cause of action was legal. Ohio courts, however,
should only focus on the type of remedy sought. Although there is sound
reason for limiting a jury trial to legal causes of action,137 there is no
reason to exclude causes of action established after 1802 from receiving
a jury trial. Laws evolve because societal values evolve; that is part of the
political process. Thus, closing the door to the right to a jury trial merely
because the General Assembly in 1802 did not establish a particular cause
of action both shackles citizens to a completely different time and
undermines the legitimate legislative change that happens day-to-day in
every society.
Advocates of Ohio’s approach might argue that guaranteeing a jury
trial in new causes of action changes the right, but that is unpersuasive.
Incorporating new causes of action into the right would not alter the right
136. Id.
137. For instance, one could argue that laypeople are not sufficiently educated in the legal field to
decide whether a plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief.
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as it existed at common law. When the Supreme Court holds that the First
Amendment applies to Facebook138 or that the Fourth Amendment applies
to thermal imaging,139 the Supreme Court is not changing a particular
right. Instead, it is merely taking new facts and applying them to old
constitutional analyses. Take grammar, for example. English syntax has
been largely unchanged since the 1800s, but the development of new
words such as “bae,”140 “hangry,”141 or “gobbledygook”142 has not
changed basic English syntactic structure. In other words, one could still
say that “this Note is gobbledygook,” even though the word did not exist
at the time of the creation of the English language, yet the structure
remains unchanged.
B. Problems with the Federal Interpretation
The federal interpretation of the right to a civil jury trial is problematic
for two reasons. First, the federal interpretation completely disregards any
historical inquiry whatsoever, despite the strict, historic language of the
text. Second, the lack of historic inquiry materially alters the right.
1. The Text
First, the federal analysis is problematic because it does not give any
weight to the word “preserve.” The Seventh Amendment provides that
“the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”143 The Court should strongly
weigh the word “preserved” because it is the only place in the Bill of
Rights where the Framers used that particular word. Reasonable minds
can disagree about how to interpret the Constitution, but the uniqueness
of the text leaves little room for debate.144 Thus, the Court should give it
at least some weight.
In considering the word “preserved,” the Court should conclude that it
must adopt a historical analysis. “Preserve” comes from the Latin
praeservare: prae meaning “beforehand,” and servare meaning “to
keep.”145 Taking the words together, “preserve” means to keep it as it was
beforehand. To fulfill this command, courts should not dismiss the
historic practices of the eighteenth century like the federal courts do.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
Kyllo, 533 U.S. 25.
Bae, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (11th ed. 2021).
Hangry, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (11th ed. 2021).
Gobbledygook, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (11th ed. 2021).
U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added).
Thomas, supra note 10, at 3.
Preserve, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (11th ed. 2021).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss3/6

16

Hoback: The Best of Both Worlds

2022]

THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS

967

Rather, they should look to the common law traditions to determine how
the right to a civil jury trial was kept. Therefore, courts should take the
modern cause of action and render a decision based on how it would have
been understood at the time of the right’s ratification. In doing otherwise,
courts ignore the plain language of the text.
2. (Lack of) Originalism
Second, despite the apparent instruction to “preserve” the right, the
federal analysis alters it. The Constitution requires the jury trial to be
preserved in suits at common law.146 By “common law,” the Court has
explained that the Framers referred to “suits in which legal rights were to
be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where
equitable rights alone were recognized.”147 But the Court has slowly
strayed away from what the Founders considered legal and equitable, thus
changing the right from how it existed in 1791. For example, in
Teamsters, the Court held that a duty of fair representation was mostly
analogous to a breach of fiduciary duty—an equitable issue.148 The Court,
however, ruled that the action was legal based on modern distinctions
between legal and equitable causes of action.149 In other words, the case
would have been decided differently in 1791. Consequently, the right
today is different from the right as it existed at common law—the
antithesis of preservation.
Although recent cases have allowed for a more expansive interpretation
of the right through the current federal analysis, the pendulum could
easily swing the other way. It might be easy to suggest that the federal
analysis is objectively better because it has led to favorable and more
expansive results, at least for now. Justice Kennedy, however, cautioned
against this line of thinking, explaining to the Court that “[i]f we abandon
the plain language of the Constitution to expand the jury right, we may
expect Courts with opposing views to curtail it in the future.”150 Justice
Kennedy’s criticism is warranted. Indeed, this has happened before. In the
1760s, criminal151 matters, which were often heard in courts of law
(where a jury existed), started getting brought in the admiralty and viceadmiralty courts, where no right to a jury existed.152 Under the current
146. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 434 (1830).
147. Id.
148. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 569-70 (1990).
149. Id. at 570.
150. Id. at 593. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
151. Although the issue of the right to a jury trial in criminal cases is a question of Sixth
Amendment interpretation, this analogy is still applicable to this argument since the same could have been
done to equitable claims.
152. Landsman, supra note 28, at 595.
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federal reasoning, this could occur today. Suppose that a party requested
a jury trial in a case that the Framers would have considered legal.
Although the Framers might have concluded that the cause of action was
legal, the Court could nevertheless hold that the cause of action is
equitable based on how it thinks the right should be preserved rather than
how it was, thereby depriving the right. Therefore, to ensure that courts
do not restrict the right just as they have expanded it, courts should only
focus on how the Framers applied the right rather than establishing new
standards on their own.
C. One Solution for Two Problems
Courts should adopt the hybrid approach. Under this methodology, a
court would identify the closest historical analog to the current cause of
action and determine whether it was considered legal or equitable at
common law. Recall the Court’s decision in Curtis.153 There, the Court
compared housing discrimination under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
to a similar cause of action that existed prior to the right’s adoption.154
Then, the Court considered whether a jury trial existed based on the
classification of the remedy at the time.155 Federal courts should return to
this analysis and make it their only consideration, and Ohio courts should
adopt it too. This is exactly what “keeping it as it was beforehand” means.
In other words, based on the drafters’ understanding of legal and
equitable, the court would apply the right as it would have been
understood in 1791.
Courts should adopt this approach because it stays faithful to the
original understanding and text of the right while also valuing legislative
change. First, the hybrid approach stays faithful to the original
understanding of the right because it applies the legal-equitable
framework as it existed at the time of the ratification. In other words, it
does not consider what is now thought of as legal or equitable, but instead
what was legal or equitable to the drafters of the constitutions. Second,
the hybrid approach values legislative change by making the right
applicable to new causes of action.
Additionally, the hybrid approach makes it more difficult for courts to
undermine the right. One of Justice Kennedy’s well-founded critiques of
the current federal approach is that the courts could use this power to
restrict the right to a civil jury trial.156 The hybrid approach prevents any
153. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
154. Id. at 195 n. 10.
155. Id. at 196.
156. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 593 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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possibility of that happening by establishing a firm floor that incorporates
all causes of action at the time of the ratification and the analogs thereto
into the right to a civil jury trial. Thus, courts cannot exclude those causes
of action from the right to a jury trial. Moreover, each legislature, under
analogous equitable causes of action, can establish a right to a civil jury
trial under the specific statutes. Thus, the hybrid approach establishes the
minimum of causes of action in which a jury trial is guaranteed without
possibility of reduction but also allows the legislatures to extend the right
as far as they desire.
Finally, this approach respects the will of the elected people who
ratified the Bill of Rights and the Ohio Constitution. Deciding whether a
right to a jury trial exists is a tough job, but somebody has to do it. The
million-dollar question is: who decides? Under the federal analysis, courts
decide. But under this proposal, the understanding of those who voted for
the adoption of the Bill of Rights prevails. With a glimpse back to history,
one can look at how this practice existed in the English and American
legal systems at the time of the right’s ratification. Indeed, the
understanding of the right two-hundred years ago may be antiquated and
inappropriate for today—or just flatly wrong. But at least under this
approach, the courts are giving deference to the political process and the
understanding of those who voted for ratification of the constitutions.
That is what democracy is all about.
IV. CONCLUSION
To balance both interests of evolution and tradition, Ohio and federal
courts should adopt the hybrid approach. Recall Justice Scalia’s opinion
in Kyllo. His reasoning is important to this issue because it conveys an
important reality—that tradition and evolution can live in harmony.
Because the world keeps spinning while the words on legislative texts
remain stagnant, it can be tempting to think that preserving tradition and
“staying with the times” cannot occur simultaneously. But that thought is
shortsighted. The hybrid approach allows courts to extend the right to new
causes of action but also preserves tradition by requiring a historical
comparison to the right at its ratification. Under this approach, citizens
can enjoy the same right that existed in 1791 and 1802 under new causes
of action, while also knowing that courts will not have the liberty to add
or subtract from their fundamental rights. Simply put, they can enjoy the
best of both worlds.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2022

19

